Tại sao mong muốn của một người không nhất thiết là sự tự chủ của người đó?

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Tự chủ, tự trị, tự quyết – chúng là những cách dịch khác nhau của autonomy, một khái niệm làm nền tảng cho vô số cuộc tranh luận đạo đức trong truyền thống phương Tây, như chủ nghĩa tự do, công lý, nhân quyền, y đức, phá thai, trợ tử, hôn nhân đồng tính, chiến tranh, quảng cáo, thậm chí là bảo vệ môi trường. Nó cũng là một đề tài quan trọng trong nhiều lĩnh vực khác nhau: giáo dục, tâm lý, chính trị, pháp luật,

Theo quan sát của tôi, thường trong lĩnh vực giáo dục và tâm lý học sẽ dịch là “tự chủ”, triết học dịch là “tự trị”, y tế và pháp luật dịch là “tự quyết”. Ở đây tôi sẽ dùng cả ba cách dịch.

Dưới đây là bản lược dịch của bài viết Autonomy: Normative trên trang Bách khoa toàn thư Internet về Triết học. Bạn nào muốn có cái nhìn đầy đủ hơn về tự trị có thể đọc bài viết đó.

Personal Autonomy

Without question, the majority of contemporary work on autonomy has centered on analyses of the nature and normativity of personal autonomy. Personal autonomy (also referred to as ‘individual autonomy’) refers to a psychological property, the possession of which enables agents to reflect critically on their natures, preferences and ends, to locate their most authentic commitments, and to live consistently in accordance with these in the face of various forms of internal and external interference. Personally autonomous agents are said to possess heightened capacities for self-control, introspection, independence of judgment, and critical reflection; and to this extent personal autonomy is often put forth as an ideal of character or a virtue, the opposite of which is blind conformity, or not ‘being one’s own person.’

As mentioned above, personal autonomy has an essential relation to authenticity: the personally autonomous agent is the agent who is effective in determining her life in accordance with her authentic self. Personal autonomy is thus constituted, on the one hand, by a cluster of related capacities (often termed ‘authenticity conditions’), centered on identifying one’s authentic nature or preferences and, on the other hand, by a cluster of capacities (often termed ‘competency conditions’) that are centered on being able effectively to live in accordance with these throughout one’s life in the face of various recalcitrant foreign influences. These capacities may be possessed singly or in unison, and often require a considerable amount of life experience to assume robust forms.

One of the most intractable problems surrounding personal autonomy concerns the analysis of the authentic self (the ‘self’ in ‘self-determination’, as it were).  Some philosophers have claimed that no such self exists; and indeed, some philosophers claim that no self exists at all (for an overview of these problems, see Friedman 2003 and Mackenzie & Stoljar 2000).  Most philosophers accept the possibility of the authentic self at least as a working hypothesis, however, and concentrate attention on the question of how authenticity is secured by an agent. The most popular and influential account is based on the work of Harry Frankfurt and Gerald Dworkin. According to their ‘hierarchical’ account, agents validate the various commitments (beliefs, values, desires, and so forth) that constitute their selves as their own by a process of reflective endorsement. On this account, agents are said to possess first-order and second-order volitions. Our first-order volitions are what we want; and our second-order volitions are what we want to want. According to the hierarchical model, our first-order desires, commitments, and so on are authentic when they are validated by being in harmony with our second-order volitions: that is, when we want what we want to want. Following from this model, an agent is autonomous in relation to a given object when the agent is able to determine her first-order volitions (and corresponding behavior) by her second-order volitions. A simple example may help to illustrate the model. Say that I am a smoker. Although I enjoy lighting up, I do not reflectively endorse my smoking; I desire it, but I do not want to desire it. On the hierarchical model, smoking is not an aspect of my authentic self, because I do not reflectively endorse it; and to the extent that I am unable to change my habits, I am not autonomous in relation to smoking. Conversely, if I can bring my first-order volitions into harmony (or identity) with my second-order volition, then my desire is authentic because it is reflectively endorsed; and to the extent that I can mold my behavior in accordance with my reflective will, I am autonomous in relation to smoking.  Persons who possess the requisite capacities to form authentic desires and effectively to generally live in accordance with them are autonomous agents according to this model (see Frankfurt 1971, 1999 and Dworkin 1988).

The hierarchical model remains–in outline, at least–the leading account of authenticity undergirding most contemporary accounts of personal autonomy, although it has been attacked on many fronts. The primary objection tendered against this account is ‘the problem of origins.’ As we have seen, authentic selfhood as reflective endorsement holds that my authentic self is the self that I reflectively ratify: the self that I endorse as expressing, in a deep sense, who I fundamentally am or wish to be. The problem of origins arises when one attempts to explain how this act of reflective endorsement actually constitutes a break from other-determination (that is, from foreign influence). For, could it not be the case that what appears to me to be an independent act of reflective endorsement is itself conditioned by other-determining factors and therefore ultimately an other-determined act? If this is the case, then it doesn’t seem that the possession of autonomy or the making of autonomous choices is possible. In short, the problem is how to sustain an account of self-determination that is not threatened by the pervasive effects of other-determination (see Taylor 2005 for elaboration on the problem of origins and related sub-problems). Much work on theories of personal autonomy has been explicitly devoted to addressing precisely these sorts of difficulties.

Besides analyzing and clarifying the authenticity conditions necessary for autonomy, philosophers have also worked on providing a thorough account of the competency conditions necessary for the presence of autonomy (see Meyers 1989, Mele 1993, and Berofsky 1995). Competency conditions, as we have seen, are those capacities or conditions that need to be present in order for one to be effective in living according to one’s authentic self-conception in the face of various kinds of interference to that end.  Examples of competency conditions include self-control, logical aptitude, instrumental rationality, resolve, temperance, calmness, and a good memory.

In addition to authenticity and competency conditions, many theories of personal autonomy require the presence of certain external enabling conditions: that is, external or environmental (social, legal, familial, and so forth) conditions which are more than less out of the agent’s control, but which must be in place in order for fully autonomous living to be possible. Such enabling conditions include, for example, a modicum of social freedom, an array of substantive options for choice, the presence of authenticity-oriented social relations, and autonomy-supporting networks of social recognition and acknowledgment (see Raz 1986 and Anderson & Honneth 2005). Without these conditions, effective autonomous living is said by some to be impossible, even where authenticity and competency conditions are robustly satisfied. Different autonomy theorists place different emphases on external enabling conditions. Some contend that external enabling is a necessary condition for autonomy (see Oshana 1998). Others hold that autonomy more properly concerns agential satisfaction of authenticity and competency conditions, regardless of whether the external environment allows for actual autonomous expression (see Christman 2007). Both views can claim some intuitive support. On the one hand, it is reasonable to hold that it is only fitting to call a person ‘autonomous’ if that person is in fact effective in living according to her authentic self-conception. Yet, it also makes sense to call persons ‘autonomous’ who have formed an authentic self-conception and possess the requisite competency conditions effectively to express that self-conception, but happen to lack the contingent socio-relational conditions that allow for the expression of that authentic self. A possible solution to this impasse may be to avoid seeking hard and fast borders to the existence of autonomy, and say that autonomy is present in both cases, but is more robust where the proper external enabling conditions are in place.

The question of normative commitments associated with personal autonomy possession has also been a matter of some dispute. Many philosophers hold that autonomy is normatively content-neutral. According to this account, one (or one’s commitments) can be autonomous regardless of the values one endorses. On this account, one could commit to any kind of life–even the life of a slave–and still be autonomous (see, for example, Friedman 2003). Other philosophers hold that autonomy possession requires substantive normative constraints of some kind or other–at the very least, it is argued that one must value autonomy in order to be truly autonomous (see Oshana 2003). As with the debate just mentioned, both sides of this debate can claim some intuitive support; this can be shown through the asking of opposing but seemingly equally compelling (apparently rhetorical) questions; namely, ‘Can’t one autonomously choose whatever one wants?’, and, ‘How can we call someone autonomous who doesn’t value or seek autonomous living?’ One possible solution to this debate is to say that while almost any individual choice can be autonomous, persons cannot live autonomous lives as a whole without some commitment to the value of autonomy.

Unlike moral and existentialist autonomy, personal autonomy is possessed in degrees, depending on the presence and strength of the constellation of internal capacities and external enabling conditions that make it possible. While not all persons possess personal autonomy, it is commonly claimed that virtually everyone–with the exception of the irredeemably pathological and the handicapped–possesses the capacity for personal autonomy. In addition, the links between personal autonomy possession and moral agency are usually said to be thin at best. Even those who hold that personal autonomy possession requires substantive normative commitments of some kind (such as, for example, a commitment to the value of autonomy itself), they usually hold that it is quite possible to be an autonomous villain. Some philosophers have argued that personal autonomy possession requires the presence of normative competency conditions that effectively provide agents with the capacity to distinguish right from wrong (see Wolf 1990), but this strong account is in general disfavor, and even if the account is correct, few would argue that this means that personally autonomous agents must also always act morally. In the face of this, one may wonder why autonomy-based claims are said to generate demands of respect upon others. This question will be dealt with in more detail in section 4 below.

Lastly, a word should be given on the relation between personal autonomy and freedom (or liberty, which is here taken to be synonymous with freedom). Although it is not uncommon to find the terms ‘(personal) autonomy’ and ‘freedom’ used essentially synonymously, there are some important differences between them.

More often than not, to claim that a person is free is to claim that she is negatively free in the sense that she is not constrained by internal or external forces that hinder making a choice and executing it in action. There is a clear distinction between autonomy and negative freedom, however, given that autonomy refers to the presence of a capacity for effective authentic living, and negative freedom refers to a lack of constraints on action.  It is entirely possible for a person to be free in this negative sense but nonautonomous, or–on accounts that do not require the presence of external enabling conditions for autonomy to be present–for a person to be autonomous but not (negatively) free.

Some writers also speak of positive freedom, and here the connections with autonomy become much deeper. Speaking very generally, to be free in this sense is to possess the abilities, capacities, knowledge, entitlements or skills necessary for the achievement of a given end. For example, I am only (positively) free to win an Olympic gold medal in archery if I am extremely skilled in the sport. Here it should be clear that one can be positively free in many ways and yet not be autonomous. Some philosophers, however, following Isaiah Berlin (Berlin 1948), have described positive freedom in such a way that it becomes basically synonymous with personal autonomy. Like autonomy, the conception of freedom that is operative in a given discussion can vary considerably; but more often than not personal autonomy is distinguished from freedom by the necessary presence, in the former, of a connection to the authenticity of the agent’s self-conception and life-plan–a connection that is usually not found in conceptions of freedom.

Autonomy as a Right

Lastly, autonomy is sometimes spoken of in a manner that is more directly normative than descriptive. In political philosophy and bioethics especially, it is common to find references to persons as autonomous, where the autonomy referred to is understood principally as a right to self-determination. In these contexts, to say that a person is autonomous is largely to say that she has a right to determine her life without interference from social or political authorities or forms of paternalism. Importantly, this right to self-directed living is often said to be possessed by persons by virtue either of their potential for autonomous living or of their inherent dignity as persons, but not by virtue of the presence of a developed and active capacity for autonomy (see Hill 1989). Some have argued that political rights (Ingram 1994) and even human rights generally (Richards 1989) are fundamentally based upon respect for the entitlements that attend possessing the capacity for autonomy.

Sự hy vọng sẽ không bao giờ đến...

… không phải là vì nó có thể bị dập tắt (“hy vọng trồi lên bất tận” – Alexander Pope), mà là khi ta học được rằng thế nào ta cũng sẽ thất bại mỗi lần hy vọng xuất hiện. Khi một người đã chịu nhiều nỗi đau đến mức một ngày họ bàng hoàng kết luận rằng họ không còn khả năng để hy vọng thêm một lần nào nữa rồi, thì toàn bộ thế giới xung quanh họ sẽ rùng rùng biến đổi. Một khi họ đã học được rằng mình hoàn toàn bất lực để thay đổi tình hình, thì kèm theo đó họ cũng sẽ có những niềm tin mới để hợp lý hóa sự cam phận của mình. Những niềm tin mới này – tuy sai – nhưng lại rất logic, khiến cho họ không những không có động lực để thay đổi, mà còn có động lực để không thay đổi.

Đã có hằng hà sa số những bài viết giải thích những ngộ nhận phổ biến, và cũng đã có hằng hà sa số những dự án thay đổi nhận thức cộng đồng. Nhưng cuộc sống đã cho họ quá đủ trải nghiệm rồi nên họ mới thành ra như thế. Giờ muốn họ thực sự suy nghĩ điều ngược lại thì cần cho họ một sự trải nghiệm mới nhiều gấp đôi, gấp ba. Nên nếu chỉ dừng ở việc hy vọng cái hiểu đúng sẽ đủ khả năng cạnh tranh với cái hiểu sai, còn bản thân những thứ đang dung dưỡng cái sai thì không bị đả động đến, thì chỉ là chữa phần ngọn chứ không phải phần gốc. Nên không giống như những dự án xã hội khác, chúng tôi chọn con đường mà chúng tôi tin là triệt để hơn: xây dựng một con đường để mọi người cùng hợp lực xóa bỏ những hiểu lầm, ngộ nhận và niềm tin sai của bạn mình mà không quá gian lao.

Cho đến nay chúng tôi đã tìm hiểu 7 ngành và 25 chuyên ngành khác nhau để làm nền tảng cho dự án. Từ khi web hoạt động đến nay trung bình mỗi ngày chúng tôi đón nhận 160 lượt xem trang. Mục tiêu của chúng tôi là lan tỏa rộng hơn khái niệm sự bất lực học đượcthử nghiệm và hoàn thiện cách tiếp cận họkhai phá sâu hơn các vấn đề nằm chìm đằng sauthông qua sự giúp sức của các bạn đồng chí hướng. Dự kiến chúng tôi cần tối thiểu 70 triệu VNĐ để hoạt động cho năm 2021 (200k/ngày), bao gồm trả lương, trang thiết bị, đi lại, thuê chuyên gia.

Tinh thần của dự án Quả Cầu là: phản tư với mọi quan điểm của mình, trân trọng người khác tuyệt đối, tò mò với điều khiến mình sợ hãi, và dũng cảm thay đổi cái gây hại. Chúng tôi cần sự hỗ trợ của bạn để lan tỏa tinh thần đó. Bất kỳ sự đóng góp nào, dù lớn hay nhỏ, đều quý giá. Hãy hỗ trợ Quả Cầu dù chỉ là một ly cà phê – và bạn sẽ chỉ mất một phút để giúp. Cảm ơn bạn.

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